#3: God, Morality, and Humanity – The Moral Argument

Is the existence of God necessary, or more precisely, is there a need for the existence of a necessary being? Theists have presented numerous philosophical and scientific arguments in favor of a positive response to this question. However, atheists employ various evidence and techniques to challenge or refute these arguments. In a series of posts, I will aim to assess prevalent arguments and the most frequently encountered counterarguments against them. If we discover that a necessary being, which we will treat as synonymous with God, is indispensable to avoid logical inconsistencies when explaining the origin of the universe, we then conclude that this being must be logically necessary. In other words, if there is solid logical reasoning supporting the necessity of a being like God, we assert that God exists. The answer to this question alone will significantly shape our perspective of not only history but all aspects of reality.

The Moral Argument 

In this post, we will shift focus and explore a philosophical argument, which also happens to be my favorite–– the Moral Argument. If we can declare that morality is objective, this would serve as evidence for the existence of God, as well as provide additional invaluable insights into the nature of God. Now, the question arises: Is there evidence supporting the truth of objective morality? Like all philosophical arguments, absolute proof cannot be given, however, there are compelling reasons to consider it highly probable. A powerful argument comes from Micheal Jones of InspiringPhilosophy1. Credit for this argument and a significant portion of the analysis below goes to him. It goes as follows:

Premise 1: Morality is a rational enterprise.

Premise 2: Moral Realism is true, meaning moral facts and duties exist.

Premise 3:  Moral problems and disagreements among humans are too great for us to assume moral facts and duties are grounded in a human source of rationality.

Premise 4: Moral facts and duties are grounded in a necessary rational source (from 1, 2, 3)

Premise 5: This source is what we call God.

Conclusion: God Exists and is the source of moral facts and duties.

What is Moral Realism?

To begin, we must establish a definition of moral realism, also known as objective morality. In his book “Metaethics: An Introduction”, Andrew Fisher defines moral realism as the following: “Moral Realism holds that moral judgements can be true or false, that sometimes they are true and that what makes them true is independent from people’s (or groups of people’s) beliefs, judgements, or desires”2. Objective morality can be likened to the laws of mathematics. In the same way that mathematical truths are discovered rather than invented, objective moral principles exist independently of human perception. Humans, through their moral reasoning and development, unveil and articulate moral truths much like mathematicians discover and describe the inherent principles of numbers. However, just as mathematical concepts aren’t created by mathematicians but are revealed through exploration, moral truths are not originated by humans but are merely manifested by them. These distinctions are important to remember as we move forward.

Premise 1

Premise 1, positing that morality is a rational enterprise, is rooted in the idea that ethical judgments and principles inherently entail thoughtful reasoning and intellectual reflection. It presupposes that individuals engage in a cognitive process to formulate moral conclusions, underscoring the significance of rationality in shaping moral beliefs and decisions. This assertion is widely accepted, with the only dissenters being non-cognitivists. However, scholarly criticism and the Frege-Geach Problem3 have led to the substantial decline of non-cognitivism, revealing its logical inconsistencies. While this premise might not directly lead to the conclusion of objective morality, it does clarify a widely accepted and significant aspect of morality. The premise is sound. 

Premise 2

Premise 2—that moral realism is true, meaning moral facts and duties exist—is not only the foundation of the argument but also stands as the focal point of criticism. There are many different positions in metaethics representing the nature and existence of moral truths. However, I posit that the combination of logic and intuition alone can point us to the truth.

Consider a moral subjectivist who is also a climate activist—something of a typical representation of those who might resist the idea of objective morality. This individual deems certain actions, policies, or behaviors of others as either right or wrong based on their concerns about the impact on the environment, ecosystems, and future generations. However, being a subjectivist means recognizing that moral judgments are subjective and vary from person to person. Therefore, as Jones states4, why would this subjectivist advocate for and enforce their views on others who may choose differently? In a subjective moral framework, why should it matter how others treat and value the environment if their perspectives are not only equal but have no real-world value?

To delve deeper, numerous moral subjectivists assert that actions such as enslaving women in certain Middle Eastern countries, murdering infants with disabilities in specific African tribes, or committing mass genocide of 11 million people (as perpetrated by the Nazis) are morally wrong. Interestingly, subjectivists may assert these moral judgments about other cultures, all the while maintaining that moral frameworks are subjective and contingent upon individual or cultural perspectives— each of which are considered equally valid. From the subjectivist standpoint, do not these other cultures have the right to determine their own moral standards? To carry this to its logical conclusion, were then the Nazis and Hitler not justified in their attempt to eradicate the Jews, as it was simply deemed acceptable within their distinctive cultural and moral framework, which, according to this perspective, would be considered as valid as any other moral belief? This is a concession the subjectivist must make to avoid undermining their perspective entirely.

For those who approach morality realism with skepticism, a crucial consideration arises: Do you believe that there are people in the world engaging in actions that, according to their own convictions, should cease, irrespective of their personal beliefs about the correctness of their behavior? If the answer is yes, it introduces a significant contradiction to a subjective stance. Does this not imply that, to some extent, you might implicitly accept the existence of a moral reality? A reality not solely defined by humans but one that must be adhered to, and importantly, is irrespective of individual perspectives? If the response is negative, it implies that the skeptic must be content in affirming the Nazi moral framework is valid.

Moreover, moral relativism is simply illogical. As Andrew Fisher articulates, “Consider an example: Imagine that I claim late-term abortion is morally wrong, but you claim it is not. Common sense tells us that we cannot both be right and that one of us must have made a mistake. If moral realism is false and late-term abortions do not possess the property of being either right or wrong, then it is challenging to comprehend why we cannot accept that we both could be right.”5 If contradictory viewpoints can be equally true, this contradicts the foundational principles of logic. It is completely illogical to maintain that two entirely contradictory propositions can be simultaneously correct, hence making moral relativism an illogical position.

Due to this, I posit that either ethical nihilism or objective morality is the correct answer, leaving no room for the intermediate stance of relativism. To those unfamiliar, ethical nihilism asserts that there are no objective moral truths. In this view, morality is considered a human construct and there is no moral order or objective basis for ethical claims. If nihilism holds true, the actions of individuals like Adolf Hitler, the values of the KKK, involvement in child sexual exploitation, torture, and all conceivable forms of crime are not inherently wrong. I boldly assert that no human being (in a healthy mental capacity) truly believes this. We can reference the universal human intuition that suggests the existence of moral rules and duties, thereby countering the validity of nihilism.

While some may view relying on intuition as a weak foundation for evidence, I strongly contend otherwise. As Richard Boyd suggests6, just as observations hold significance in scientific decision-making, moral intuitions serve a parallel role in moral reasoning. We evaluate general moral principles and theories by examining how their consequences align (or fail to align) with our moral intuitions about specific cases. Similar to how we trust in our five senses to form our observations unless there’s compelling evidence to the contrary, why should we doubt our intuitive sense of moral facts unless we obtain convincing reasons to do so? And as we’ve discussed, these reasons often involve either logical inconsistencies or equating morally disparate actions. The burden lies on the skeptic attempting to argue against moral realism. Unless they can provide compelling reasons to assert that, for instance, sex slavery is not morally wrong or that universal moral intuition is entirely mistaken, their argument remains baseless.

Essentially, to categorize something as morally right or wrong, one must acknowledge the existence of a foundational moral reality. Without this acknowledgment, the logical basis for attributing moral value crumbles quickly. While one could argue that moral values are mere illusions, those advancing such a stance bear the burden of demonstrating how this perspective, which contradicts widespread human intuition and lacks supporting evidence, can be considered valid—a task that proves quite challenging. Now, a crucial decision emerges: either embrace intuition and affirm moral realism, or dismiss our intuition without sufficient reason and reject morality entirely. I personally, and I suspect many others, lean toward realism. Premise 2 stands affirmed.

Premise 3

Having confirmed the truth of moral realism, it becomes crucial to pinpoint the origin of these moral truths. Logically, for moral realism to be valid, there must be a source or grounding for these objective moral truths. Premise 3, asserting that moral problems and disagreements among humans are too extensive to assume moral facts and duties are grounded in a human source of rationality, underscores the impossibility of humans being the source. This is not a difficult thing to conclude. It is quite evident that human imperfections and limited knowledge of factual details preclude us from being flawless moral beings. A simple examination of history underscores this reality, revealing countless instances where humans have consistently struggled to comprehend moral truths and fulfill moral duties. If we acknowledge that people fail to perfectly understand morality and perform moral duties, we acknowledge the truth of this premise. Furthermore, our status as contingent beings logically disqualifies us from being the foundational source of moral truths. Premise 3 is sound.

Premise 4

If not humans, where do moral truths find their origin? Premise 4 asserts that moral facts and duties are grounded in a necessary rational source, providing valuable parameters to answer this question. The affirmation of Premise 4 can be derived through logical deduction from Premises 1-3. For instance, as Premise 2 states moral realism is true, and moral facts and duties exist, it logically follows they must be grounded in something necessary and unchanging. Furthermore, since morality is deemed a rational enterprise (Premise 1), we must logically deduce that moral facts and duties are grounded in a rational source. As non-sentient objects lack rationality, the logical inference points toward something sentient. This leads us to conclude that moral facts and duties are grounded in a necessary, rational source, thus affirming Premise 4.

Premise 5 and Conclusion: 

Premises 1-4, through logical reasoning, lead us to the conclusion that a conscious, rational, and necessary entity must be the source of morality—an entity we call God. With Premise 5 simply affirming this, we can confidently assert the conclusion: that God exists and is the source of moral facts and duties. It seems clear to me that if we are to affirm the reality of any sort of moral values, we must then conceit there is God, who is at the foundation and has made moral truths known to us. 

Revealed Truth 

I’d like to revisit the last statement, “and has made moral truths known to us.” This specific phrase, a logical culmination of our premises, holds a crucial insight that emerges with the recognition of the argument. If we concede the existence of moral truths, derived from God as previously examined and affirmed, it naturally implies a relationship between humanity and God. This, however, poses a major challenge to the position of Agnosticism—the belief that the existence of God, the divine, or the supernatural is unknown or unknowable. For the agnostic, accepting the reality of morality implies an acknowledgment that God has disclosed some of His truth to us. Does this not, in some sense, acknowledge that God can be known to humanity? The communication of moral truths signifies an intentional connection, suggesting that God desires humans to understand and adhere to these moral principles. Furthermore, not only would this mean humanity can come to know certain truths of God, but in understanding and living by these moral principles, humans engage in a meaningful relationship with the divine. A thought-provoking challenge for the moral realist-agnostic.

To emphasize, this moral argument not only establishes the existence of a God, but also asserts a profound connection between God, morality, and humanity. Therefore, it prompts the consideration that certain religions might encapsulate truth. If moral truths have been revealed by God, what would prevent the possibility that additional truths have been revealed by God, potentially confirming one of the religions? To clarify, based on this logical speculation alone, we cannot reasonably infer this as a probable reality; however, the door undeniably opens for further exploration and consideration. Let us do just that.

Considering the Cosmological, Teleological, and Moral Arguments Together

To assess the potential truth of a known religion, it is helpful to reference these three arguments in tandem, each of which has introduced various parameters concerning the nature of God. Using these parameters, all of which have been deemed necessary in order for the arguments to function, can allow us to explore if any specific religion(s) hold up when tested against them. 

When we consider both the Cosmological and Teleological arguments together, they not only assert the necessity of God but also posit God as necessarily immaterial, beyond the structure of space and time, conscious, and infinitely intelligent and powerful. Additionally, the arguments imply the oneness of God, asserting a necessary singular being rather than multiple necessary beings. Introducing multiple beings would give rise to logical dilemmas, including infinite regression and challenges related to contingency. Now considering the moral argument, if God is the source of objective morality as it suggests, moral attributes like goodness, justice, love, and wisdom are not separate qualities but are unified in the singular essence of God. For if morality were a standalone quality possessed, but not sourced, by God, our quest for its origin would inevitably lead us beyond God— something impossible by our definition. In other words, God is necessarily the intrinsic embodiment of all moral attributes.

We have established our defined parameters: God is singular, immaterial, transcendent of space and time, conscious, possesses infinite intelligence and power, and is the embodiment of goodness, justice, love, and wisdom. Which religions believe this about their respective deity?  Based on these criteria alone, we have narrowed the possibilities down to three religions – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. While further investigation is required to determine the validity of these religions (a task to be addressed in future posts), it is remarkable to observe the compelling implications that this argument unfolds when pursued to their logical conclusions.


Notes and Sources

[1]  Jones, Michael. “The Moral Argument.” Youtube, 4 August 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cp9Nl6OUEJ0&t=327s.

[2]  Fisher, Andrew. Metaethics: An Introduction. Acumen, 2011. pp. 77

[3]  Marturano, Antonio. “Non-Cognitivism in Ethics.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://iep.utm.edu/non-cogn/.

[4]  Jones, Michael. “Moral Realism: Defended.” Youtube, 7 July 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zjkgD4w9w1k&list=PL1mr9ZTZb3TX3tuBN–XNn4TQcLfVtqiq&index=3.

[5]  Fisher, Andrew. Metaethics: An Introduction. Acumen, 2011. pp. 58-59

[6]  Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey, editor. Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press, 1988. pp. 184

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